We use highway procurement auction data to analyze the California Small Business program that awards a contract to a qualified small bidder provided its bid is within five percent of the overall low bid. We study the effect of this rule on bidders' incentives to participate in procurement auctions and compute its implied efficiency and distributional costs. Small bidder can use the discount to improve both his mark-up and the probability of winning the project. The last effect dominates at the upper end of the support where small bidders use the cushion of the discount to squeeze out larger bidders with high costs. This effect is, in general, stronger when distributions of project costs differ substantially across groups of bidders.
Introduction
Governments use a number of programs to reduce the under-representation of identifiable groups of firms in public procurement. Under these programs, disadvantaged firms often receive some form of preferential treatment in the auction mechanism used to award public contracts. Examples of preference programs include set-aside contracts, quotas, and bid discounts. In this paper we focus on California's use of bid discounts in promoting the participation of small businesses in highway procurement and study the effect of the discounts on bidders' incentives to participate in procurement auctions and on the implied efficiency and distributional costs of the bid preference program.
Despite the prevalence of these affirmative action programs, there are only a few studies of their implications for disadvantaged firms, their competitors, and the cost of procurement to the government. Existing work focuses primarily on analyzing the effect of the preferential treatment of disadvantaged bidders on bid levels. Among others, the papers that contributed to this literature include analysis of preferential treatment in highway procurement by Denes (1997) and Marion (2005) , in FCC spectrum auctions by Ayres and Cramton (2000) , and in experimental settings by Corns and Schotter (1999) . Marion (2004) provides an initial analysis of the effect of an affirmative action program on participation through the descriptive comparison of two types of auctions.
The use of preferential treatment programs in procurement auctions has several consequences for firm behavior. By improving the effective competitiveness of disadvantaged firms, it affects both their and other firms' bidding behavior. The auction is also likely to attract a larger number of disadvantaged firms, which in turn may discourage other, potentially lower-cost firms from participating. While theoretical models of participation (e.g. Samuelson (1985) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Levin and Smith (1994) ) make clear predictions about the direction in which variables such as bid levels change under a preferential treatment program, they yield ambiguous predictions for the cost of the program to the government and provide no assessment of the magnitude of the changes in participation behavior. They also provide little guidance as to how participation decisions and their effects differ under different informational environments or how we can distinguish between informational environments in the data.
In order to study the effects of such favoritsm, we would ideally like to be able to compare a set of auctions with a preference program to the comparable set of auctions without any program. Unfortunately, such data are generally not available. Instead, we develop and estimate a model of entry and bidding that incorporates the specific terms of the program we study and consider the estimated model's predictions for firm behavior were the program to be eliminated.
We first characterize the theoretical implications of introducing a program similar to California's in a procurement market. Under the California Small Bidder Preference program, the lowest qualified small bidder wins a contract provided its bid is within five percent of the overall low bid. We use a simple model of participation previously described in the literature (e.g. Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004) ) that considers two groups of firms that decide over participation in an auction for a single project and, if they choose to participate, the bid to submit. The firms' decisions depend on two different costs: a cost of entry and a cost of completing the project. We allow the distributions of costs to differ across groups to capture possible cost-based differences as a reason for the under-representation of disadvantaged businesses. Upon paying the entry cost, they learn their cost of completing the project. Only firms with a cost of entry below their ex-ante expected profit from bidding decide to submit a bid. When making the participation decision, firms observe only the number of potential bidders and their own cost of entry.
If the number of actual competitors is known at the time of bidding, small bidders use a bid discount both to improve their expected mark-up and probability of winning the project. The last effect is more pronounced at the upper end of the support where small bidders use the cushion of the discount to lower their effective bids below cost. Therefore, large bidders with similar cost levels can never win the auction. They either bid their costs or stay out of the auction. Simulation study shows that the probability of winning effect dominates for the larger part of the support if distributions of costs differ substantially across groups of bidders.
We perform an empirical assessment of the program, building upon earlier studies of the highway procurement market such as Bajari and Ye (2003) , Hong and Shum (2002) , Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) , Krasnokutskaya (2003) and Porter and Zona (1993) . As in the literature on entry into product and auction markets (e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) , Berry (1992) , Mazzeo (2001) , Seim (2005) , Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004) , Li (2005) and Li and Zheng (2005) ). Our estimation approach yields empirical entry and project cost distributions that match firms' observed participation and bidding decisions to the outcomes of the discrete entry game between potential bidders. We use simulated maximum likelihood method to uncover the parameters of project cost and cost of entry distributions. Estimation results are used to simulate the outcome of an auction without preferential treatment and, thus, infer effects of the program on the number of important variables.
Our empirical results for the case of observed competition suggest that small bidders, the target of California's program, are indeed weak bidders in the market with on average higher costs of completing a project. However, we find that differences in the cost of completing the project are small relative to the differences in the cost of entry. We estimate that small bidder's cost of entering the project is on average 50% higher than similar cost of a large bidder with costs of entry diverging as projects increase in size. This further implies variation in the program effects across project sizes. We find that for medium size project the program induces substantial increase in the small bidder's probabilities of winning and participation in the project while leaving the cost of procurement unchanged. On the other hand, the program produces moderate probabilities' effects in small projects and rises the cost of procurement by about 4%. Finally, we find the strongest probabilities effects' in the set of large projects where the cost of procurement actually decreases. Our results confirm that the program increases inefficiency of the auction mechanism. This effect occurs across all projects sizes.
Finally, we find that the magnitudes of the estimated effects depend of the specification of the entry model. In particular, the perfect information model (fixed entry cost) implies higher magnitude of the effects as compared to the asymmetric information model (stochastic cost of entry). Therefore, it is important to use flexible specification which allows to estimate variance of the cost of entry distribution from the data instead of imposing it a priori in the model.
Related Literature on Bid Preference Programs
Despite the prevalence of governmental programs to promote the involvement of firms of various types in procurement, there is little work studying their effects. Marion (2004a) looks at the effect of the preferential treatment program in highway procurement auctions. By granting a bid preference to high-cost firms, the government loses surplus from low-cost bidders by awarding contracts to likely higher-cost competitors. At the same time, the preferential treatment increases the competitive pressure exerted by favored bidders. Nonfavored bidders respond by bidding more aggressively, possibly driving down winning bids and the cost of procurement to the government. Marion analyses this trade-off using data on highway construction contracts that the California Department of Transportation awarded between 1996 and 2002. In descriptive regressions, he shows that large firms bid 1.4% lower on preference auctions than on similar non-preference auctions. At the same time, small firms bid 1.4% higher in preference auctions than in similar non-preference auctions. He finds further that preference auctions increase procurement costs by 3.5%, possibly because the likelihood of large firm participation is smaller for preference auctions than for non-preference auctions. Marion obtains these results by comparing federally funded and state-funded projects. In California, federally funded and state-funded contracts are covered by two separate disadvantaged bidder programs that differ in the type of company they focus on. Marion's results thus compare the outcomes of the two programs. We instead conduct a counterfactual analysis to isolate the effects of the bid preference program. Denes (1997) looks at how setting aside a share of contracts for small bidders affect the cost of government contracting. He has data on winning bids for federal dredging contracts during 1990 and 1991, as well as detailed information on the project as well as participation in the bidding process. He then compares the mean normalized winning bid for set-aside contracts (where only small businesses compete) to the mean for general contracts (where all companies can compete). He finds statistically significant differences in normalized winning bids in only one of eight contract categories, with the winning bids in set-aside auctions being lower than the comparable winning bids in general auctions. He concludes that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that set-asides increase costs. He suggests that one possible reason that set-asides produced either no change or a lower bid price than unrestricted dredging is that more firms bid on the set-asides. On average, 3.6 firms bid on the set-asides, while only 3.1 firms bid on the unrestricted solicitations. He states that "apparently there is a large population of qualified set-aside participants who only bid on set-aside procurements. The analysis suggests that setting aside contracts for small businesses does not necessarily reduce the number of competitors bidding on the project and, in this case, increased the number of competitors."We investigate the importance of similar participation patterns in the California highway procurement market below.
The Highway Procurement Market
The analysis in this paper is based on data from highway and street maintenance projects auctioned by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) between January 2002 and April 2005. During this period, 1,491 projects were advertised, of which complete data are available for 1,204 projects. In addition, 9 contracts were postponed, leaving a set of 1,195 awarded project contracts.
Each contract specifies provisions to encourage the participation of disadvantaged businesses. Two types of disadvantaged business programs are used in California. One program that applies to federally funded contracts attempts to increase the share of public work conducted by disadvantaged minority-, women-, or veteran-owned businesses by recommending a percentage of the contract's value to be subcontracted out to a disadvantaged business. This disadvantaged-business quota varies across contracts depending on a case-by-case assessment of the availability of disadvantaged businesses for the type of work required by the project. In our data, it ranges from 5% to 35% of the value of the contract.
A second program facilitates participation by disadvantaged businesses in procurement by granting qualified companies a bidder preference. Preferential treatment is granted to qualified small and veteran-owned bidders. We focus on the bidder preference program in this paper. We begin with an overview of the small bidder preference program before describing the contracts and bidders that it affects.
California's Small Bidder Preference Program
The California's Small Bidder Preference program arguably pursues several goals. Some of them are political such as "allocating fair proportion of contracts to different groups of bidders". Other goals have economic motivation at core such as increasing participation in govenment procurement at the expense of less efficient bidders to impose competitive pressure on the more efficient companies in the short run, or, in the long run, providing small companies with an oportunity to improve their efficiency through "learning-by-doing" or develop a reputation if these features are important in a given market.
As a Certified Small Business, the firm qualifies for a 5% bid preference on applicable state contracts and is eligible for advantageous payment terms. The small bidder preference is applied when a non-certified bidder submits the lowest bid. The contract is then awarded to the lowest certified small bidder if that firm's bid is within 5% of the overall lowest bid. The preference is used for comparison purposes only, and does not affect the amount at which the contract is awarded to the small bidder.
To be eligible for Small Business Certification, the business must be an independently owned and operated company located in California and have at most 100 employees and average annual gross receipts of $10 million or less over the previous three tax years. The certification of companies is undertaken by the California Department of General Services, which certifies eligible companies for a period of up to 4 years. The Department of General Services publishes a quarterly directory of qualified companies that allows us to identify small bidders among auction participants. Of the 672 companies that bid on at least one project from January 2002 to April 2005, 269 or 40% were certified for at least a part of this period.
Project award process
The process by which Caltrans awards a highway procurement contract to a qualified bidder proceeds in several steps. Once funding for a project has been secured and contract documents have been prepared, Caltrans advertises the project on its internet web site, which offers public access to advertised plan sets, proposals, special provisions, and wage information for prospective bidders, subcontractors or vendors. Advertising periods can range from three to ten weeks or more depending on the cost or complexity of the project.
Contractors interested in submitting bids for Caltrans contracts must purchase bid documents from the Caltrans Project Plans Counter for between $13 and $90 a set. On the bid opening date, bidders submit the completed bid forms that indicate the itemized and total amount for which the company proposes to complete the contract. In addition, they submit a bid bond of at least 10% of the total bid amount, as a promise that the bidder will accept the contract if awarded.
Within five working days following the bid opening, Caltrans awards the contract. A payment bond in the amount of the total bid guarantees that the contractor will pay any workers, subcontractors and/or suppliers, while a performance bond in the amount of 50% of the total amount of the contract assures that the contractor will complete the work satisfactorily. In the case of state-funded contracts, the small bidder preference is invoked if necessary and the winner's small business status is verified. Work on the contract commences generally several weeks after the contract award, upon official Caltrans authorization.
Contract characteristics
We focus on state-funded projects and the preferential treatment program administered on these projects. The Caltrans data contain a verbal description of the work to be carried out for the contract, which we aggregate into 8 categories: bridge work; construction and repair of buildings; new road construction; landscaping; road marking; road repair; electrical work; and maintenance work on small structures. Road-repair work accounts for 49.04% of contracts and is by far the largest category. We use counties as project locations. The duration of the project is given in working days, ranging from 8 to 2,310 working days across projects, with a median length of 45 working days. An important project descriptor is the engineer's estimate of the total cost of the project measured in $, which serves as indicator of the size of the project. Similar to the duration variable, the engineer's estimate exhibits a skewed distribution across projects with an average of $2.25 million and a median of $ 457 thousand. 
Market participants
We obtained a list of companies that purchased project plan packages for each project in our data from the Project Plans Counter. Since these packages are also purchased by companies with no apparent interest in becoming a bidder on the contract, such as companies that track construction activity, we treat only those plan holders as potential bidders in the subsequent auction if the companies bid on at least one project during the period of our sample. The data furnished by Caltrans contain the name and address of the plan holders, which we use to match the plan holder information with the directory of qualified small businesses obtained from the Department of General Services and data on actual bid outcomes obtained from Caltrans' Office of Engineer. We complement the Caltrans data with information obtained from Reference USA on participant characteristics such as the number of different locations in the state, employment size categories by location, and the 6-digit SIC code corresponding to the location's primary line of business.
For a typical state-funded project in the data set, the Plans Counter issues between 5 and 16 packages, with an average of 10.33 and a median of 9. For the most popular projects in the 90th percentile, 18 packages are requested. The average project receives 4.32 requests for bidder packages from qualified small businesses, with a median of 3 packages.
The share of qualified small bidder plan holders varies with project attributes, decreasing in the project's size and increasing in its duration. This suggests that small companies are primarily interested in smaller-scale projects that require limited resources and longer projects that provide steady business.
Since Caltrans publishes the list of companies that purchase bid documents for all projects being advertised, potential bidders are aware of other companies that are sufficiently interested in the project to purchase plan packages. This serves as our motivation for the assumptions of our theoretical model that firms know the remaining potential entrants for the projects they choose to participate in.
Participation Decisions by Small and Large Contractors
While project plans are available to firms at a relatively low cost, submitting a bid to Caltrans is more costly since it requires the firm to prepare a detailed estimate of how much it would charge for each item included in the contract. Consequently, only 50.66% of plan holders submit a bid on any given auction. Small bidders are less likely to submit a bid, with a conversion rate of 43.11% on state-funded projects. This results in an average number of 4.93 bidders on each project, of which 1.90 bidders are qualified small businesses.
Conversion differs further by project attributes. Conversion is highest for the shortest projects with a duration of less than 30 working days with rates of 47.71% for small bidders and 60.53% for large bidders and decreases steadily in project duration. Small bidder conversion rates decline as well in the project's size, falling from 53.40% for projects with an engineer's estimate below $250 thousand to 33.88% for projects above $2.5 million. This trend is not nearly as pronounced for large firms, pointing again to differences in the match between project attributes and firm capabilities between the two types of firms.
Results of the analysis to submit a bid are presented in table 2, allowing coefficients to differ for small and large plan holders. We allow for company-specific factors in the form of capacity utilization and the distance from the company's office to the project to affect the bidding decision. We estimate the company's current capacity utilization using a measure proposed by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) . We use data on the identities of winning bidders and sizes and duration of the project to identify companies that work on any Caltrans project at any given point in time. We disregard the initial six months of data to build up a history for firms that win subsequently awarded contracts. We assume that the company allocates the work on a particular project uniformly within the allotted duration of the project. We then compute the monthly load generated by each project the company is working on in a given month. The sum of these loads is our proxy for monthly capacity utilization. The distance between company and project locations is measured as the distance between the counties in which the company and the project are located, for lack of a more finely defined project location.
We estimate both a Probit model and a fixed-effect Logit model of the participation decision. We find that distance to the project exerts a significant negative effect on the probability to bid for both types of firms. A higher distance between the bidder and the project drives up the company's cost of moving equipment and labor to the site, and the participation decision may reflect such cost considerations. A high current load consistently increases both large and small bidders' probability to submit a bid, possibly since work on any new projects would occur at future times, after the current backlog of projects has been exhausted.
Among project characteristics, both the project's size and its duration influence the bidding decision. We measure project size as the log of the engineer's estimate, scaled by the mean engineer's estimate. The effect of this size measure is of particular interest. The probability to submit a bid increases significantly with the size of the project for large firms, but decreases significantly for small firms, consistent with the descriptive evidence outlined above. At the market level, the total number of potential bidders who previously purchased plans to the projects has a negative effect on any one firm's decision to submit a bid on the project. The importance is less pronounced for small plan holders with marginal effects of -0.024 and -0.026 relative to -0.037 and -0.044 for large plan holders in the Probit and Logit models, respectively. Overall, small plan holders are less likely to become participants than large plan holders, with marginal effects of -0.461 and -0.103 in the Probit and Logit models, respectively. We reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for large and small plan holders are equal, suggesting that the participation decisions differ significantly across types of bidders.
Bidding Behavior by Small and Large Contractors 3.6.1 Bid levels
The bidder preference program can affect bid levels in several ways. It is likely to increase the probability of bidding by small businesses. With additional entry, competition in the auction increases. At the same time, the preferential treatment of small bidders imposes additional competitive pressure on large bidders. Table 3 analyzes average bids at the bidder level as a function of bidder and project characteristics whose effects are again allowed to differ by type of firm. Among project characteristics, the engineer's estimate is the most significant determinant of bid levels, justifying its use as a proxy for project size. Projects of longer duration generate, on average, higher bid levels, however the effect is smaller and not always significant across specifications and types.
The role of company characteristics, such as distance to the project and current load, do not play a large role in determining bid levels, suggesting that they may only imperfectly capture firms' cost and capacity considerations. The average bid of a small bidder is between 10.05 and 17.91% above that of a large bidder.
We control for the competitive environment by including the number of plan holders and the number of bidders as regressors. Across types and specifications, bid levels decrease significantly in the number of bidders, but increase in the number of plan holders, as a measure of potential competition. Since we do not control for auction-specific heterogeneity beyond the project's location and the work involved, unobserved auction characteristics may confound the effect of a larger number of participants on bid levels.
While the bid regressions suggest that small bidders bid higher on average, they do not directly isolate the effect of the presence of small bidders on large bidder behavior. To do so, we compare the bidding behavior of large firms in auctions where no small bidder is present to that in auctions where exactly one bidder is present. Figure 1 compares kernel density estimates of large firm bidding distributions under alternative competitive environments. Specifically, we hold the total number of bidders or participants constant and consider the effect of replacing a large bidder by a small bidder on large bidder behavior. We plot the two bid distributions under the presence of zero and one small bidder. As a comparison, we include the bid distribution of the single small bidder across projects with the same number of bidders or participants. Since small bidders are likely weaker bidders, replacing a large bidder by a small bidder may lead to an upward shift of the large-firm bid distribution. The preferential treatment of small bidders counters that effect. The change in going from auctions with no small bidders to auctions with one small bidder represents the net of these effects, as well as possibly unobserved auction characteristics that induce small bidders to stay away from a certain subset of projects. The effect of the bid preference program is most pronounced in the first chart in the figure, which shows bidding behavior in auctions with three bidders. Here, the large-firm bidding distribution shifts to the left in going from zero to one small bidder. This suggests that the bid preference significantly strengthens the competitive threat of the small bidder. The effect is less clear in the second chart in the figure. It illustrates that bidding behavior changes due to the presence of a small bidder, however, large bidders do not uniformly bid lower once a small bidder participates in the auction. This could be because small bidders in these auctions are significantly weaker so that their preferential treatment is inconsequential.
Winning Bid
The bidder preference program awards projects to qualified small bidders provided their bids are within a reasonable amount of the low bid. Overall, small bidders win 35.45% of all state contracts. In 4.59% of state-funded contracts, the bidder preference program alters the ranking of bidders by awarding a contract to the lowest small bidder at the expense of the non-qualified low bidder.
The median winning bid of a small bidder is below that of a large bidder, amounting to $301.65 thousand. This compares to a median winning bid for large bidders of $687.43 thousand, not controlling for sorting of small and large bidders into projects of different characteristics. We explain the winning bid more fully as a function of project and bidder characteristics in Table 4 . Conditional on size, duration, and district and work categories, the results indicate that the winning bid on state contracts is on average between 3.23% higher if the winner is a qualified small business and is 6.75% higher once we control for competition proxied by the number of bidders and plan holders. The winning bid increases with the engineer's estimate and the number of working days. There are further significant differences in winning bid amounts for different work classes, reflecting both heterogeneity in the difficulty of the specific work involved and differences in the liquidity of the market for the work category. This analysis does not allow us to disentangle the effect of the preferential treatment of small bidders on winning bids from the effect of systematic differences in bidders' costs being responsible for this difference in small and large firm winning bids. The model we develop in the following section provides a more complete framework for separating these effects.
Model of Firms' Participation and Bidding Decisions
This section develops a model of firms' participation and bidding decisions in the presence of a bid preference program. The model forms the basis for our empirical work below. The government's goal is to procure the services of a construction company to complete a single project. We assume that there are N companies that are interested in this project (potential bidders). In our environment a company is a potential bidder if it purchases bidding package. In line with the terms of the Caltrans small bidder preference program, we consider two types of companies: those that satisfy requirements of the program and the rest. The number of potential bidders in each group j is N j , with N 1 + N 2 = N . When deciding on the winner, an auctioneer compares the overall lowest bid and the lowest bid among the type 1 bidders. If the later is within a δ percentage points of the former then the project goes to the lowest type 1 bidder otherwise it is awarded to the overall lowest bidder.
Similar to other work on entry into auctions (e.g. Samuelson (1985) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Levin and Smith (1994) ), we frame the firm's decision as a two-stage process. Initially, each firm decides whether or not to participate in the auction. To participate firm i has to incur cost d i . Cost of entry is a private information of a potential bidder. We assume that they are distributed according to the distribution G. 1 Upon entry a firm submits a bid, b ij . The firm's bid depends on its cost of completing the project, which we denote by c ij . We assume that the company knows its own project cost at the time of bidding, however, the cost is private information of company. Its competitors know only the distribution of firm i's project cost F j defined on the interval [c, c] for j = 1, 2. We make three assumptions on the distributions of firm costs: (A 1 ) Project costs c ij are mutually independent across firms; (A 2 ) the probability density functions of projects costs, f 1 and f 2 , are continuously differentiable and bounded away from zero on [c, c] , and (A 3 ) firm i's entry cost d i and project cost c ij are independent draws from the distributions G and F j .
Next, we outline the informational environment in which firms make their participation and bidding decisions. We first consider the case where firm learns the number of actual competitors after entering the auction. We then relax this assumption and study bidding strategies and participation decisions in the environment where the number of actual competitors remains unknown. We show below that this alternative specification entails significant differences in the level of the bidding strategies and thus mark-ups generated by bidders.
Non-Stochastic Number of Bidders
As in Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) , we assume that in the initial participation stage, each potential bidder i knows only its own cost of entry, d i , and the distributions of entry costs G and project costs, F 1 and F 2 . After incurring the entry cost to participate in the auction, the firm learns its own cost of completing the project c ij and the number of other firms in each group who similarly decided to participate. We denote the number of participants by n 1 and n 2 .
Characterization of Equilibrium in the Bidding Stage
We begin with an analysis of the bidding stage and then use the results to complete the analysis of the participation stage. Due to the bid-preference program, a participating bidder i of type j wins the project if its bid is below all competing bids adjusted by the bid discount δ where applicable. Firm i with cost c ij chooses bid b ij to maximize the resulting expected profit conditional on participating:
, denotes type j's bidding strategy that maps a given project cost, c ij , to the firm's bid. Since we assume that the number of bidders is observed after the initial participation decision, the bidding stage is a standard first-price sealedbid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. The first-order condition of the firm's bidding problem is:
We focus on type-symmetric equilibria where companies of the same type follow the same strategies. The first-order conditions, together with the boundary condition defined below, uniquely characterize optimal bidding strategies (Maskin and Riley (2000) ).
Small bidders use a bid discount both to improve their expected mark-up and probability of winning the project. The last effect is more pronounced at the upper end of the support where small bidders use the cushion of the discount to lower their "effective" bid, b (1+δ) below its cost, c. This means that large bidders with high cost levels can never win the auction. If forced to submit a bid such bidders would bid their cost.
If only one small bidder is present in the market he chooses β 1 (c) to maximize
The first order conditions corresponding to this problem are given by
When auction attracts more than one small bidder competition leads to β 1 = c. In summary, in an auction with preferential treatment and without a reserve price, bidding strategies are characterized by:
i .
Characterization of Equilibrium in the Participation Stage
At the participation stage, firms compare the expected profit conditional on entry to their entry cost d i . Firms with entry costs below their expected profit decide to incur the entry fee to learn about the cost of completing the project. This yields type-specific thresholds, D j , such that only firms with entry costs below their group's threshold learn their project cost.
Since under the preferential treatment of type 1, type 2 bidders have a zero probability of winning if their cost is above
, we assume that they do not submit a bid upon learning that their project cost falls into this range. The likelihood of observing a bid submitted by type-2 bidders is thus lower than the likelihood of them incurring the entry cost (exante participation probability). Let p a j , p j denote the ex-ante and ex-post probabilities of participation respectively. Thus, the ex-post probabilities of participation for types 1 and 2, p 1 and p 2 , are given by:
Expected profit from participating is given by
where Pr(k j , k −j |p j , p −j ) is the probability of observing k j competitors of the firm's own type and k −j competitors of the opposite type, given entry probabilities p j and p −j ; π ij (c ij ; k j , k −j ) is an expected profit of a bidder from group j with cost realization c ij computed on the basis of bidding strategies described in a previous section. Expected profit reflects that at the participation stage, the firm is uncertain about both its own project cost and the competitive environment it will face upon entry. As a result, expected profit differs only by group j, but no longer by firm i. The firms assess the probability that there will be k j and k −j competitors in the auction as
Entry cost thresholds are defined by a zero-profit rule so that D 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) = Π 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) and D 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = Π 2 (p 1 , p 2 ). In equilibrium, bidders beliefs are correct and the equilibrium entry probabilities solve the system of equations
Assumptions (A 1 ) and (A 2 ) guarantee that the type-specific equilibrium of this game exists. In general, the entry equilibrium is not unique. There may be multiple threshold pairs that describe equilibrium in the overall game. These equilibria are observationally equivalent, however, in terms of submitted bids and differ only in entry probabilities. In solving the model for a given set of distribution functions, we verify the uniqueness of the equilibrium entry probabilities numerically.
Computing Bidding Strategies
The first-order conditions in the bidding stage describe a system of differential equations in the firms' bidding strategies, β. Solving for equilibrium entry probabilities requires knowledge of the bid functions that map project costs to bids. The asymmetries in bidders' project costs make analytical solutions to the system of differential equations intractable. We therefore extend techniques proposed by Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) to solve the system of differential equations numerically. We use polynomial series expansion techniques, beginning at the highest project cost level, c, and extrapolating backward to the lowest cost level c. The solution algorithm is stable and efficient in solving the first-order conditions. Bajari (1999) and Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) provide detailed analysis of the performance and advantages of numerical solution algorithms for asymmetric auctions.
We illustrate the models' properties in the context of a specific example. We assume that bidders' project costs are distributed according to a truncated normal distribution with mean μ j and standard deviation σ j , defined over the interval [0,1]; entry costs are distributed uniform on [0,0.25]. We consider the case where there are two potential entrants of both types. With a maximum of four firms in the market, there are 8 possible realizations for the number of participants, ranging from (k 1 = 1, k 2 = 0) to (k 1 = 2, k 2 = 2). Computing expected profit of participation entails computing optimal bidding behavior for all eight subgames defined by (k 1 , k 2 ).
As a point of reference, we begin with a comparison of the two models in the absence of a bid preference program. We vary μ j and σ j to illustrate the effect of distributional differences in project costs on firm's behavior. Figure 2 depicts bidding strategies for a set of normal distributions where type 2's project cost distribution first-order stochastically dominates that of type 1, holding the variance in costs fixed. The cost distributions are illustrated in the top left panel of figure 2. Across specifications, the bidding strategies end in the highest cost, reflecting that the highest cost type has no incentive to bid below the cost whereas competitive pressure does not allow him to raise his bid.
The middle left panel of figure 2 shows bidding strategies for different combinations of k 1 and k 2 . Given that type 1 bidders are weak bidders in this example, they submit higher bids in distribution than type 2 bidders. At the same time, however, for a given level of cost, type 1 bidders face higher competition by the opposite type, causing them to lower their bids relative to type 2 bidders. As a result, a type 1 bidder may win the auction, despite the fact that the firm is not the lowest-cost bidder. Figure 2 illustrates the bidding strategies for the cases of a 10% bid preference. The middle right panel shows individual bidding strategies for model 1 for different firm configurations. Type 1 now moves from bidding lower to bidding higher than type 2 bidders for a given level of cost. Type 2 is forced to bid their costs in the upper tail of the cost distribution. In general, a type-2 firm bids more aggressively, relative to the case without preferential treatment.
Alternative Model of Entry
The model described above imposes a number of potentially restricting assumptions on the informational structure of the environment in which bidders make their decisions. In this section we introduce an alternative auction environment that differs along one dimension: bidders knowledge about their actual competition at the time when they prepare their bids. We analyze participants' behavior in this alternative environment.
Model with Stochastic Numbers of Bidders
We maintain the assumption that firm i knows its own cost of entry, d i , and the distributions of project costs for the two groups, F 1 and F 2 , when making the decision on whether to participate in the auction. Once the firm decides to participate, it learns its own cost of completing the project, c ij , but not the number of the actual bidders. Firms choose their bid based on their assessment of the likelihood of participation by different bidders and the distributions of project costs. As above, firms' expectations about the likelihood of each firm's participation in the auction underlie its expectation about the number of actual bidders. Firms' expectations about the distribution of the number of actual bidders enters both pre-and post-entry expected profit. Post-entry, upon learning its project cost c ij , firm i submits a bid to maximize expected profit of
where Pr(k 1 , k 2 ) is again the firm's assessment of the likelihood of facing (k 1 , k 2 ) competitors at the bidding stage, given by the expression in equation (6). As above, (β 1 (c ij |N 1 , N 2 ), β 2 (c ij |N 1 , N 2 )) denotes a pair of equilibrium strategies. Bidders' maximization problem no longer depends on the number of actual competitors the firm faces in a given auction. Therefore its bidding strategy no longer changes with the number of actual competitors.
Similar to our initial setup, the entry stage is defined by entry thresholds for the two types (D 1 , D 2 ) such that a firm enters as long as Π j (p 1 , p 2 ) ≥ D j , where pre-entry expected profits now equal
While this setup relaxes the assumption that bidders learn the number of competitors they face upon entry, both models share the feature that it is the distribution of entry costs that determines which firms become active bidders. The firms' actual costs of completing a given project do not affect their participation decisions. A more realistic setup would allow both entry costs and the cost of completing the project to enter a firm's participation decision.
Empirical Implementation and Results
The predictions of the entry and bidding models outlined above consists of type-specific entry predictions as well as bidding strategies that map the distribution of firm costs into a distribution of type-specific bids. The goal of the estimation is to recover the underlying parameters of the project cost and cost of entry distributions that best explain firms' observed bidding behavior. We begin by discussing estimation methodology for Model with non-stochastic number of bidders. We then describe the set of preliminary results.
Estimation Methodology
We estimate the parameters of the bid distributions, denoted by H j , and entry cost distribution G parametrically using maximum likelihood techniques. We then use the estimated bid distributions to recover the underlying project cost distributions, F j , assuming that
The likelihood of bidder i's entry and bidding decision, l ij , is the joint probability of the firm's participation decision and its bidding decision conditional on entry. Assuming that the entry cost distribution, G(·), is independent of the project costs distributions and therefore bid distributions, H 1 (·) and H 2 (·), this likelihood is the product of firm i's probability of entry p j as predicted by the model times the likelihood of observing its bid to be b ijp given the probability density of bids, h j . For firms that choose not to participate, the likelihood is simply given by the probability of non-participation.
Following Krasnokutskaya (2003) we decompose the observed bid into a component that derives from observed project characteristics and private information of the firm about it costs, B ijp , and a component that captures unobserved auction heterogeneity, u p . We assume that b ijp = B ijp u p and that both H j follow Weibull distributions and the distribution of unobserved auction heterogeneity follow normal distribution, where H j now refers to the distribution of B ijp . This structure arises if bidders' costs are equal to the product of an individual cost component that is private information of the firm and a common component observable to all bidders. The common component may potentially be unknown to the econometrician and therefore summarizes unobserved auction heterogeneity from his/her point of view. For the distribution of unobserved auction heterogeneity, we assume a mean m u = 1 and a constant standard deviation s u . We let the mean of H j , m B j , vary with observed auction characteristics, x p , as well as the competitive environment in the auction, captured by n 1 and n 2 . We estimate constant type-specific standard deviation s Bj .
The theoretical model uses a bounded cost distribution, implying a similarly bounded bid distribution. We use the observed bid data to non-parametrically estimate a typespecific lower bound b jp of the bid distributions for auctions with similar characteristics. We do not impose an upper bound during the estimation of the bid distribution, but truncate the distribution in the computation of participation probabilities.
Since the use of a lognormal distribution for u does not allow for a closed form likelihood function, we use simulation techniques to integrate over its distribution. For a given simulation draw u ps from the normal distribution of unobserved auction heterogeneity, we first compute equilibrium entry probabilities then we average across simulation draws, n s , to obtain the simulated log likelihood function for participation decisions, denoted by indicator I ijp , and bid levels:
whereb ijps denotes the transformed bid of
and we use the nonparametrically estimated lower bid bound and the ex-post imposed upper bid bound as limits of integration.
To compute equilibrium entry probabilities for a given simulation draw u ps we first recover the inverse bid function associated with observed bid distribution using the first order condition of the bid problem. For a given guess at (p 1 , p 2 ), we integrate the expression for expected profit numerically as
Given expected profits, we update the ex-ante entry probabilities. We assume that entry costs, d j , are distributed according to a normal distribution with type-specific mean and a variance that is identical for both types. Accordingly, the ex-ante probabilities of entry, p j , are Probit probabilities:
where Φ denotes a normal pdf with mean m Dj and standard deviation s Dj . These entry probabilities serve as an update to our guess at p 1ps and p 2ps .
We iterate in computing expected profit and updated entry probabilities until the fixed point of the system (12) has been found for the given draw from the distribution of u.
Estimation Results
In this section we present preliminary estimation results. We use the parametric estimation techniques outlined above to estimate both the parameters of the bid distributions, allowing them to vary by type, as well as the parameters of each type's cost of entry distribution. We assume that observed bids follow a Weibull distribution whose type-specific mean shifts with the project's size and duration, as well as the competitive environment and whose standard deviation is type-specific, but does not vary with project characteristics. We similarly allow each type's mean entry cost to vary with the project's engineer's estimate. We then use these estimates to simulate the outcome of different types of auctions in environments with alternative bid preference programs. In future work, we plan to incorporate additional bidder-heterogeneity in the estimation. Table 5 shows parameter estimates. In line with the descriptive regressions above, the estimates suggest that qualified small bidders submit higher bids than large firms, on average. The effect is however, small in magnitude; a qualified small firm's mean log bid is approximately 1.026 times the corresponding log bid of a large bidder. In terms of practical significance, bid levels are primarily determined by the project's engineers estimate, increases of which get nearly fully passed through to bids. Mean bids decrease in more competitive auctions. While increases in participation of small and large bidders decrease bids, the number of large bidders have a stronger effect than the number of small bidders. In response to encountering one additional large bidder in an auction, firms scale down their mean log bids by a factor of 0.968, relative to a factor of 0.966 if bidder is small. As above, the number of plan holders of either type is positively correlated with mean log bids. The results also suggest that there is larger variation in small firms' bids. The estimated standard deviation of their bid distribution is 1.037 times standard deviation for large bidders, suggesting that there is larger heterogeneity in small bidders' cost of completing a project. In summary, the parameter estimates are in sign and statistical significance as expected: small bidders bid higher on average, with a larger standard deviation, suggesting that their costs are higher but more dispersed on average. The practical significance of the difference between the two bidder types is small. This is illustrated in figure 3 , which shows the empirical distributions of bids for the median project with one small bidder and three large bidders. Figure 4illustrates the fit of the chosen specification. The figure plots the distribution of bid residuals in our sample across projects and bidder types and contrast it to the distribution predicted by our fitted model.
Turning to the estimated parameters of the entry cost distribution, our main estimates suggest that entry costs increase for both types of firms with the size of the project. Small firms' costs increase more in the project's size, possibly because a small firm needs to spend a larger amount of time and resources to prepare a bid for a more complex project. We also estimate the standard deviation of firms' entry costs, allowing it to vary by bidder type. In contrast to standard probit entry models, the fact that we observe multiple projects with similar numbers of potential bidders, but different entry patterns, all else equal, allows us to identify the variance in firms' entry costs. Our estimates indicate that the standard deviation of small bidders' costs exceeds that of large bidders by a factor of 3.4, suggesting that, just as with project costs, small firms are significantly more heterogeneous in their entry costs than large firms. In contrast to the estimated bid distributions, however, the differences between small and large bidders are more pronounced, both in terms of their mean entry cost, as well as their variance.
As a robustness check, we estimate several alternative specifications of the entry cost distribution. These are displayed in table 6. The table displays four sets of results: the base specification, for reference; a specification that fixes the standard deviation of the entry cost distribution to one; a specification that restricts the distribution's variance to be identical for the two types of bidders; and last a specification that assumes that entry is determined in a mixed strategy equilibrium, instead of in a game of imperfect information about competitors' entry costs. The last specification assumes that firms pay an identical entry cost that varies across types and randomize in their behavior, instead of our base specification, which imposes a distribution of entry costs on firms. The parameter estimates that result in the three alternative specifications of the game of imperfect information are similar in entailing that small firms' entry costs increase more rapidly than large firms with the size of the project. This pattern arises as well when estimating a mixed strategy game. In this specification, the fixed cost of entry is allowed to vary with the project's size as well as its duration. The results indicate that while longer projects lead to a significantly higher cost of preparing a bid, the magnitude of this effect is quite small.
Analysis of the Bid Preference Program
We use the results of estimation to evaluate the effect of preferential treatment on the cost of procurement to the government, incentives of different groups to participate in the auction and the distribution of projects and profits across groups of bidders. Here we describe results for the fixed cost of entry specification. Results for the stochastic cost of entry with estimated variance are forthcoming.
We find that preferential treatment of small bidders allows government to increase small bidders' probabilities of winning and participation with small or no change in the cost of procurement. For example, for the medium size project discount of 5% induces increase of 18% in the small bidder's probability of winning (from 32% to 37.7%). At the same time the average cost of procurement remains unchanged since the increase in the cost of procurement when project is won by one of the small bidders is almost exactly compensated by the decrease in the cost of procurement when project is won by the group of large bidders. Inefficiency of the auction doubles since due to preferential treatment the project is more often assigned not to the lowest cost bidder. Finally, the probability of participation increases from 37% to 41.9% which constitutes an increase of 13%. Therefore, the government seem to be able to achieve its goal of increased participation at no change to the cost of procurement but substantial increase in the inefficiency of auction. Performing analysis across different discount levels we find that for medium-size projects the probabilities of participation and winning further increase as the discount level increases. At the same time the cost of procurement remains roughly the same. These findings are summarized in the table 8.
Next, we investigate effects of the program across project size levels. Our descriptive results indicate that small bidders express strong preference for smaller projects while large bidders prefer to participate in the larger projects. Our estimation results also indicate that differences in bidders costs grow with project size. Table 9 summarizes findings of the counterfactual analysis that underscore differences in program effects across projects of different sizes. In particular, we find that effect on small bidders' probabilities of winning and participation are strongest in the set of large projects: probability of winning goes up by 18% (from 27%), probability of participation by 13.5% (from 32%). At the same time the preferential treatment results in the decrease of the cost of procurement on average by $8000 (or 1.18%). On the other hand, in the set of small projects the increase in the probability of participation is not very large (3% up from 76%) whereas the probability of winning and the average cost of procurement go up more substantially (4% for the cost of procurement and 12% for the probability of winning). Dissecting these results even further we find that in small projects small bidders use the discount level to further improve their mark-ups whereas in the large projects they direct their efforts towards improving their chances of winning. This is consistent with our earlier findings in the Monte-Carlo section. Recall that in our simulations small bidders with approximately equal chances of winning relative to large bidders with similar costs try to achieve higher mark-up whereas bidders with substantially lower chances target the probability of winning. The later strategy pushes large bidders' bids down therefore lowering the average bid and expected winning bid in a given auction environment.
Finally, we find that chosen specification for the cost of entry affects the magnitude of the effects inferred in counterfactuals. In particular, our simulations show that the increase in the probability of participation is decreasing in the variance of the distribution of the cost of entry with the highest effect estimated from the model with the fixed cost of entry. Therefore, it is essential that the estimated specification allows for a flexible variance of the cost of entry which should be estimated from the data in order to correctly pinpoint the magnitude of the programs effects. These findings are summarized in table10.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop two models of participation in a first-price sealed bid auction and apply the models to study the role of bid preference programs in the award of highway procurement contracts. Both models assume that firms expend resources to learn about the costliness of a particular contract to the firm. These sunk costs of entry drive the firms' participation decisions. The two models differ primarily in their assumptions on the information available to bidders at the time of their bidding decision. We find that the assumptions on the firms' knowledge of the competitive environment entail differences in firms' optimal bidding behavior, which may affect auction outcomes under the preferential treatment of weak bidders.
The empirical results suggest that the bid preference program used in California, which grants qualified small bidders a 5% discount on their bid relative to the remaining firms in the market has significant implications for their participation and bidding behavior. To the extent that the program seeks to promote participation by disadvantaged enterprises in government procurement, it is successful: the share of projects won by qualified small bidders rises due to their preferential treatment. The increased participation comes at a cost, both in term of cost to the government, which increases by 2.5%, and the efficient allocation of projects to the lowest cost competitors in the market.
The nature of our data forces us to focus on short-term measures of the success of the program. We assess arguments that rationalize the favoritism of disadvantaged firms in procurement based on possible cost reductions for the government from putting competitive pressure on the remaining, more efficient competitors. The short time horizon of our data makes it difficult to assess the longer term goals of the California Small Bidder Preference program of allowing disadvantaged firms to grow. Work by Branco (2002) suggests that favoring higher cost firms may provide them with sufficient incentives to improve their efficiency, in particular if efficiency improvements are very costly to them. An interesting avenue for future research would be a more complete analysis of the long-term impacts of affirmative action programs in procurement to shed light on the empirical relevance of such efficiency enhancing arguments for the use of discriminatory practices. Simulation results use estimated parameters for mixed-strategy entry model with fixed entry costs. Results apply to median medium-sized project in the the data. 3.7% Small projects denote projects with an engineer's estimate in the 20th percentile of engineer's estimates across projects. Medium projects are defined to fall between the 20th and 60th percentile of the distribution of the enginner's estimate. The counterfactual is conducted for the median project within each of the three size categories and uses the estimated parameters of the mixed strategy entry game with fixed entry costs.
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